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ABSTRACT
This article reflects on the causes of the acute crisis suffered by
Spain during the decades following the victory of General Franco in
the Civil War. It emphasises the incoherence of the totalitarian eco-
nomic model that was imposed, particularly with respect to the ob-
jective of autarky. It also highlights the insufficient economic training
of the bureaucrats and the active role of military commanders in
the design of economic policy, including General Franco, who lacked
any sort of economic or historical knowledge.
Je sais qu’il importe que les hommes élevés en pouvoir soient plus
éclairés que les autres; je sais que les fautes des particuliers ne peuvent
jamais ruiner qu’un petit nombre de familles, tandis que celles des princes
et des ministres répandent la désolation sur tout un pays.
Jean-Baptiste Say1
1. Introduction
It is common knowledge that Leviathan is a monster that ap-
pears in different passages of the Bible. Leviathan was also used
by the English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, as the title
of the book in which he describes what he conceived to be the pro-
per structure of the State, which although not absolutist, should
1 Say, Traité d’économie politique, p. 35.
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have a very great deal of authority. Almost in the same period in
which John Locke was advocating the need for a limited, democratic
state with division of powers, Hobbes defended the existence of a
strong state as a way to overcome the fratricidal tendencies of
human beings, summed up in the famous phrase: “man is a wolf to
man”.
I have used the terrible monster of Hobbes’s vision to draw the
reader’s attention to what I consider to be the principal cause of the
deep and long-lasting crisis suffered by the Spanish economy during
the 1940s: the totalitarian Franco regime. I should add that this idea
is shared unanimously by the most respected researchers and intel-
lectuals specializing in this period, despite neo-Francoist efforts to
clean up the dictator’s image.
2. Ignorance and contempt for economics
The leaders of the victorious side in the Civil War, and specifi-
cally General Franco himself and one of his closest friends and most
influential advisors, Admiral J. A. Suanzes, despite their military
background and lack of economic training, had their own ideas re-
garding Spain’s economy and economic history. Furthermore,
Franco considered himself to be a remarkable theorist. He had his
own ideas, which were, let us add, unfortunately inappropriate.
They were based on the idea that Spain had failed economically be-
cause of a disastrous 19th century, immersed in civil conflict and in-
ternal disputes as a consequence of liberal ideology, the weakening
of the State’s power, centrifugal tendencies driven by particularistic
nationalisms and the incapacity of the middle classes to carry out
their historical task of industrialising the country. It is true that libe-
ral capitalism had failed, although the arguments for this thesis were
not intellectually sophisticated: “Today we are witness to the ruin
of the demo-liberal regime, the failure of parliamentary institutions,
the catastrophe of an economic system rooted in political liberalism.
These well-known truths, which only an imbecile could fail to see,
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have naturally influenced the political and economic ideologies on
which we have based the programme of our nationalism and syn-
dicalism”.2
There was a desire to restore the tradition of the glorious years
of Imperial Spain, the eternal Spain of the Catholic Monarchs and
the Emperors. Faced with free-thinking ideologies and corrosive in-
fluences from abroad, it was necessary to return to traditional
thought, Catholic fundamentalism and a patriotic essence. Uniting
the interests of all producers within the same business system was
the only way to confront the Marxist ideology of class struggle; the
weakness of the liberal state was to be combated by instituting a to-
talitarian state; the backwardness of Spain in the concert of nations
and the humiliation of 1898 would be overcome by the recovery of
the Empire. The Falange poet, Federico de Urrutia, the author of the
once famous Romance de Castilla en Armas, summarised it as fol-
lows: “This is our final leitmotiv. To be what we were after the shame
of what we have been. To kill the old soul of the liberal, decadent,
Masonic, materialist and Frenchified 19th century and to impregnate
ourselves with the spirit of the imperial, heroic, sober, Castilian, spi-
ritual, legendary and chivalric 16th century”.3
With regard to the economy, the objective was to industrialise
the country. Industrialisation was not sought as an end to itself, but
as a means to convert Spain into a military power capable of car-
rying out the imperial project. Industrialisation should be a national
achievement, dispensing with the international capitalism that had
eroded Spain’s resources during the 19th century. A closed and au-
tarkic development had to be achieved.
Farming, which despite Franco’s agricultural propaganda had
been relegated to a secondary position, had to develop in subordi-
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3 Our translation of a passage by Abella, La vida cotidiana durante la Guerra Civil. La
España nacional, p. 109.
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nate fashion in order to achieve a self-sufficient food supply for the
nation. How can economic independence be achieved and a policy
of imperial expansion carried out if a country cannot first achieve
food self-sufficiency?
The New State that emerged after the war had to assume the re-
sponsibility of undertaking this historical task. The role of entrepre-
neurship and private property was yet to be defined. In spite of
some essentially propagandistic revolutionary proclamations, it
soon became clear that the private property of the means of produc-
tion and free enterprise were respected, although with certain limi-
tations.
In the countryside, private property in land was fully respected,
despite the repeated promises of the Falange and the syndicalist
JONS to carry out a radical agricultural reform: “There is still much
to be done to ensure a genuine and fruitful Spanish economy, and
the New State will wring the neck of the alarming and tremendous
agricultural problem that exists today by expropriation of the lan-
downers”.4 We know, however, that the collectivist promises of the
Falange programme, such as the creation of “large syndicate farms”
or redistributive “economic and social land reform” were never car-
ried out. Nevertheless, the freedom of action of landowners was li-
mited, in some cases severely. The New State, through the Ministry
of Agriculture or the numerous agencies created for this purpose,
including the Servicio Nacional del Trigo (National Wheat Service),
the Instituto Nacional de Colonización (National Institute for Land
Exploitation) and Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y Tran-
sportes (Government Agency for Supply and Transportation), enac-
ted an endless list of laws that restricted the “business” freedom of
farmers: programmes that affected private property (without con-
sent from the owners), large-scale transformation projects for irriga-
tion like the Law of Large Irrigable Areas, the compulsory sale of
products to the State at fixed prices, the establishment of mandatory
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areas for crops and farming activities and the allocation of quotas of
raw materials and equipment. The whole sector was subject to ab-
solute control over its international activities. Imports were subject
to a strict system of authorisations and consisted solely of state trade.
Income from exports was the object of a selective predation as a re-
sult of the arbitrary exchange rates fixed for the peseta. In short, an
excessively meticulous system of intervention was created, which,
far from stimulating production, can be considered as the main
cause of the chaos experienced by the agricultural sector in the 1940s.
In the case of industry, state intervention was much more in-
tense. From the outset, the State became a corporation. The “failure”
of private enterprise, according to the governors of the Franco re-
gime, necessitated the creation of state companies that were directly
responsible for developing the principal industrial sectors and par-
ticularly those relevant to strengthening the Spanish armed forces.
The National Institute for Industry was the organisation created to
carry this project out. However, in addition to its direct involvement,
the State also enacted abundant legislation in order to regulate and
control private industrial activity: from regulations designed to limit
foreign capital and companies to those regarding the establishment
or expansion of industries, price fixing, or the establishment of quo-
tas and controls with respect to foreign trade. Curiously, the weight
of traditionalist thought among the group of individuals that made
up the National Movement was often visible, highlighting the lack
of internal coherence with respect to economic approach: “Craft in-
dustry – the living legacy of a glorious guild system – will be fostered
and efficiently protected, as they are a complete projection of human
people in their work and represent a mode of production that is di-
stinct from capitalist concentration and Marxist collectivism”.5
The regulation of the labour market was of common interest to
both agriculture and industry. In this respect, two elements should
be considered. First, the representative and democratic labour union
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organisations that were characteristic of the Republic were replaced
by a vertical trade union structure whereby owners and workers
were grouped according to industry in the same organisation. Se-
cond, the State assumed total control over working conditions, sa-
laries and wages, and working hours.
The commanders of the Franco regime simply assumed that the
State, i.e. the policy makers and the bureaucracy, was capable of
adopting the appropriate decisions at all times in order to ensure the
economic development of the country. This is a matter of immense
significance. The New State restricted and controlled private indu-
stry for the sake of an allegedly superior national interest. And the
New State believed that it had the capacity to define this national
interest and to adopt the appropriate measures to achieve it: “The
New State will be constructive, a creator. It will supplant individuals
and groups, and the ultimate sovereignty will reside in the State and
only the State. The only interpreter of how much universal essence
there is in the people is the State, and within it this essence will attain
its fullness. Furthermore, the State is responsible for all policies re-
garding politics, culture and the economy…”.6
Once the State had dogmatically established that it was the sole
interpreter of the national interest and was responsible for all econo-
mic policies, it took a leap into the unknown, and with the same dog-
matism the New State declared that it would carry out this economic
task. However, it is obvious that the State was not an un earthly and
omniscient being; the State was formed by specific individuals: mi-
litary personnel, senior officials, the directors of the public agencies
and state corporations. Was the strong determination of the Francoist
authorities sufficient to convert these people into expert economists?
Obviously, such an assumption is impossible to accept. However,
the Spanish economy functioned this way for twenty years. The
State – that is, politicians and bureaucrats, people with no economic
knowledge – controlled the economic fate of Spain, exercising an un-
disputed and irresponsible power.
CARLOS BARCIELA
180 THE JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
6 Doctrina e historia de la revolución española (our translation), p. 45.
05-barciela_173_200_05-barciela_173_200  30/06/16  11:25  Pagina 180
3. Spanish economists and Francoist totalitarianism
With the exception of the period of splendour of the Escuela de
Salamanca,7 Spain has never been noted for its economists or for ma-
king any noteworthy contributions to economic science. During the
first third of the 20th century, some figures emerged who, although
not known internationally, were well trained and conducted studies
and reports of undeniable quality. They included Antonio Flores de
Lemus, Luis de Olariaga, Gabriel Franco, Manuel de Torres, José
María Zumalacárregui, Francisco Bernis, Olegario Fernández Baños,
José Antonio Vandellós, Agustín Viñuales, Román Perpiñá, Enrique
Rodríguez Mata, José María Tallada, Jesús Prados Arrarte and
Ramón Carande.8 In the words of Francisco Comín: “The Spanish
economists of the first third of the 20th century had excellent theore-
tical and empirical training and were able to gain a precise under-
standing of the economic reality of their time. Furthermore, they
advised the government, designed the most important economic re-
form projects and carried out valuable studies on the Spanish eco-
nomy”.9 The same was true for other scientific fields and in the
general preparation of the bureaucracy. A good part of this human
capital was lost owing to repression and exile. In economics in par-
ticular, there was significant regression. In 2008, Manuel Martín Ro-
dríguez and Eloy Fernández Clemente published Sesenta economistas
académicos del exilio, an account of the economists who fled from
Spain in 1939 and their professional work in their adoptive coun-
tries, in many cases of great merit.10
The majority of the politicians and top economic officials in the
1940s were military personnel, engineers and lawyers. The few in-
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fluential economists – Higinio Paris Eguilaz, Antonio Robert, Ma-
nuel Fuentes Irurozqui – can be classed, with no exaggeration, as
neo-mercantilists. The most prominent economists before the Civil
War vanished from the scene: some died (Bernis, 1933; Flores de
Lemus, 1941; Fernández Baños, 1946), others went into exile (per-
manently in the case of Gabriel Franco; until 1948, in the case of Agu-
stín Viñuales). Those who continued to exercise their profession –
Olariaga, Manuel de Torres, Perpiñá, Fernández Baños, until his
death in 1946, Viñuales after his return from exile in 1948 – did so in
secondary technical or political positions, far removed from high-
level responsibility. José Larraz, the only exception, worked in the
Ministry of Finance only briefly, due to his clear incompatibility with
the economic policy of the Franco regime. Manuel de Torres, as in-
dicated by other authors, published a few early criticisms of the in-
terventionist policy, although they made very little impact. Salvador
Almenar clearly expresses the situation: “The lives of the Spanish
economists during the war and the immediate post-war period, as
in other professional fields related to politics, were often punctuated
by an alternating succession of postures, fears, flights, detentions,
imprisonments, purges and, depending on each case, incorporation
into a new position or exile”.11
Manuel Jesús González forthrightly expressed the effects of the
multiple, repeated purges: “The effect was surely that sought: to
create a climate of ideological terror in the administrative spheres.
The uniform conformity with the warrior and official ideology of
the victorious side was partly a result of this fear and partly of the
mythical capacity of the strong emotions generated by the war”.12
Zumalacárregui, a solidly educated economist who supported
the Franco regime, considered that the State should intervene in the
economy provided that it had the “technical capacity and effi-
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ciency”.13 This required the assistance of institutes for economic ana-
lysis employing competent experts capable of advising the govern -
ment. In this sense, we should remember that, as well as dispensing
with the economists, the Franco regime also eliminated or slowed
down the main institutions of economic studies, which had reached
a high level of technical competence during the years prior to the
Civil War: the Centro de Estudios Económicos de Valencia (Centre
of Economic Studies of Valencia), the Servicio de Estudios del Banco
de España (the economic research department of the Bank of Spain)
and the Institut d’Investigaciones Econòmicas (Institute of Economic
Studies) of Barcelona. If we take into account that Spain adopted a
typically fascist economic model and closed the door to the econo-
mic thought that was flourishing in the most advanced and demo-
cratic countries, the panorama was bleak. In these circumstances,
how could one imagine that the State would be capable of adopting
the right measures to direct the economy? By chance?
Keynes himself was criticised for implicitly assuming that ad-
vanced capitalist countries had sufficiently competent governors to
manage monetary and fiscal policies that were capable of regulating
the cycle. Keynes based this assumption on the existence of an ex-
tensive layer of the population educated in economics in all of these
countries. If we think of England, the number of economists and
gov ernment officials who were well trained in economics during the
two centuries previous to Keynes more than justifies the optimism
of his General Theory.14 However, in the case of Spain what made
Franco and his companions believe that their country had sufficien-
tly educated people not just to manage economic policy but to create
a new economic system?
For it should be remembered that Franco claimed, no less, that
the national-syndicalist revolution had generated essential changes
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in the economic conceptions that until then had dominated the entire
world15. Where did such absurd and dangerous ideas come from?
One cannot help setting the epigraph to this article against the words
of Richard Cobden, the liberal economist, pacifist, anti-militarist, and
supporter of free trade: “Warriors and despots are generally bad eco-
nomists and they instinctively carry their ideas of force and violence
into the civil politics of their governments. Free trade is a principle
which recognizes the paramount importance of individual action”.16
In 1936, along the same lines, Germán Bernácer warned of the risks
of economic warfare when he claimed that economic conflict and
military conflict have more in common than is generally believed.
In actual fact, the economic approaches of the Franco regime
were very crude and had no relation to economic science. They were
based on a blind faith in authority, the sanctioning capacity of the
State (including the death penalty for economic crimes) and igno-
rance of economic science; what Manuel Jesús González called “su-
premacy of voluntarism and the idea of serving higher objectives
than the so-called laws of economic behavior”.17 Maybe the best
example of this blind faith in the power of the State as opposed to
economic laws can be found in the Fuero del Trabajo (Labour Code),
the first fundamental law of the New Franco State, which in point V
states that the State will “discipline” prices. A voluntarism, as we
can see, that was loaded with hormones.18
It is unbelievable, and somewhat embarrassing, to recall the bril-
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15 In a statement to the journalist Manuel Aznar, Franco said: “I can announce that the
experience of our war will seriously influence all the economic theories defended until
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translation).
16 Quoted by Nicholas Edsall, Richard Cobden. Independent Radical, p. 186.
17 Manuel Jesús González, Los asesores económicos del gobierno durante el franquismo de
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último caballo, the Edgar Neville film made in 1950, includes a couple of scenes in which
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liant economic ideas of General Franco and his fanciful appraisals
of Spain’s natural wealth, which were published in the works of se-
veral authors. At the risk of being repetitive, let me provide exam-
ples of the General’s extravagant and destructive ideas. In 1938 he
said: “Spain is a privileged country which can be completely self-re-
liant. We have everything necessary to live and our production is
sufficiently abundant to ensure our subsistence. We have no need to
import anything”.19 In his New Year’s Eve speech of 31 December
1939, the General surprised the nation with an announcement about
Spain’s fabulous natural underground resources: “gold in enormous
quantities” and “a fabulous amount of oil shale and lignite”. As we
can see, the idea that Spain could and should aspire to economic au-
tarky came before the economic disorder brought about by the Se-
cond World War, and therefore did not respond to any external
influence, as the General and his collaborators were later to allege,
but to the conviction that achieving autarky was the correct thing to
do. At that very time, Bernácer wrote: “The people have sought to
achieve nothing less than an autarky, reducing the world to its bor-
ders and dispensing with the rest of humanity. Reality has taken re-
venge of this mad dream with one of the most violent crises”.20 It is
more than likely that Franco did not know who Bernácer was.
In 1938, Román Perpiñá, then reserve lieutenant in the “nation -
al” army, was alarmed by the economic opinions expressed by the
high-ranking officials of the General’s government, considering it
“highly dangerous to use the term autarky as an emblem and as a
device for designing the economic policy of the New State (…) it
would be merely a new word for old clichés and our deep-seated
economic policy.” As was pointed out by Salvador Almenar, from
whom the reference has been taken, this was his last expression of
non-conformity with respect to the new course of the nation.
Franco’s gullibility did not improve with time. In 1940 he belie-
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ved that he had struck the best deal in history when he bought a pa-
tent to produce gasoline from river water and a blend of herbs and
secret ingredients from an Austrian con man named Albert Elder
von Fileck. José María López de Letona, Minister of Industry be -
tween 1969 and 1973, remembers this anecdote regarding Franco:
“Meanwhile, something that attracted my attention was the interest
that he showed in the absurd case of the inventor of the ‘water
motor’, whom all the reporters were interviewing, inviting him to
give a ‘demonstration’. It took me a lot of hard work to convince him
that it was just a homemade experiment and we were not in danger
of losing a valuable patent for Spain. But Franco, who was distru-
stful by nature, feared that this was a new case of Spanish genius
that would end up relinquishing the exploitation of an invention to
a foreign country, even though his own compatriots showed apathy
and lack of interest”.21
4. Technical incompetence and conflict of interest
But it is not just a question of technical incompetence. It is also
a matter of loyal service to the State and of honour. Why should
these politicians and officials be motivated by high ideals and public
interest? Why would they not use their privileged positions to fur-
ther their own interests or those of their families and friends? Many
years ago Jean-Baptiste Say warned: “Un gouvernement ne peut agir
que par procureurs, c’est-a dire par l’intermédiaire de gens qui ont
un intérêt particulière différent du sien, et qui leur est beaucoup plus
chère”.22 Franco’s New State was characterised by technical inade-
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quacy and high levels of corruption. But Fraile has clearly explained
this: “Under the assumption that the individual agents who make
up the State are maximisers of their own utilities, the willingness of
the income generators (politicians and bureaucrats) to grant them
depends on the difference between the cost of generating them (di-
sutility of consumers/voters) and the gains from selling them (mo-
netary and non-monetary support from the groups benefited by the
politician/bureaucrat). Naturally, the smaller the political responsi-
bility of the income generators, i.e. the dependence on voters to re-
tain their position, the greater the inclination of the State
administration to grant favours to interest groups”.23 Franco’s poli-
ticians and bureaucrats, who did not depend on voters’ decisions,
could use, in addition to the traditional instruments, the many me-
chanisms of intervention that they themselves had created for their
own benefit.
5. Rudimentary mercantilism
It is important to remember that the autarkic policies, as well as
reducing welfare, were harmful in other and perhaps more serious
ways. In 1848, John Stuart Mill remarked: “But the economical ad-
vantages of commerce are surpassed in importance by those of its
effects which are intellectual and moral. It is hardy possible to over-
rate the value, in the present low state of human improvement, of
placing human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to them-
selves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with
which they are familiar. Commerce is now what war once was, the
principal source of this contact”.24 Richard Cobden held the same
view: “I believe that the physical gain will be the smallest gain to
humanity from the success of this principle. I look farther; I see in
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the Free Trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as
the principle of gravitation in the universe, drawing men together,
thrusting aside the antagonism of race and creed and language, and
uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace… I believe that the effect
will be to change the face of the world, so as to introduce a system
of government entirely distinct from that which now prevails. I be-
lieve that the desire and the motive for large and mighty empires –
for gigantic armies and great navies – for those materials which are
used for the destruction of life and the desolation of the rewards of
labour will die away”.25
Many years ago Manuel Jesús González published a work on
the economic system of the early Franco period, “Neomercantilismo
en Madrid”,26 in which he conducts an in-depth analysis of two
works by Higinio Paris Eguilaz and Antonio Robert, both highly pre-
stigious authors during the post-war years.27 If we judge the theo-
retical revolution of the Franco regime in terms of the economy
based on the contributions of these two writers, we can see that this
revolution constituted a giant step backwards in terms of economic
science, taking Spain back to the mercantilist age.
The economic ideology of the Franco regime was not even in-
spired by the father of modern protectionism, namely Friedrich List,
a German, who was philosophically liberal and supported free trade.
In his National System of Political Economy (1841), which vindicates
the prominent role of the State and the primacy of the Nation over
individuals, while he did favour protectionism it was for exclusively
historical and political reasons. If I were English, says List, I too
would be a follower of the theories of Adam Smith, but I am German
and Germany is far behind. And the only way to be able to compete
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with England in conditions of parity is to implement a transitory
protectionist economic policy, until Germany catches up with En-
gland in terms of its industrial capacity.
List criticised the mercantilist system harshly: the error of this
system, in his opinion, was to consider protectionism as desirable in
the long term. For List, protection and State intervention were re-
quirements that derived from the historical circumstances in which
the supreme interests of the Nation were immersed. From a more
human perspective, he admitted that the ideal scenario would be to
seek increasingly close relationships, through free trade, promoting
peace among nations until a universal union was attained.
For the Franco government officials, unlike List, and like the
most rudimentary mercantilists, such as the 17th-century French eco-
nomist Antoine de Montchrétien, protectionism was a necessary and
permanent system of economic reality: a passionately nationalistic
protectionism with xenophobic currents, reminiscent of the hot-
head ed imprecations of the French mercantilist against those whom
he described as “foreign leeches” and with boastful displays of self-
sufficiency that had very little to do with the reality of an impoveri-
shed country. Curiously, in 1936 Vicente Sevillano Carvajal
published a book with the expressive title La España…¿de quién? In-
gleses, franceses y alemanes en este país [“Spain….whose? The English,
the French and the Germans in this country”], which speaks of the
“sucking effect” of foreign investment and calls for its nationalisa-
tion.28 Montchrétien’s “leeches” were attacking once again.
These approaches can be seen in detail in the writings of Higinio
Paris Eguilaz, a doctor-turned-economist who had a remarkable in-
fluence on the configuration of the economic system of the Franco
regime. It is worth remarking, in passing, that the fact that he was a
doctor does not mean he could not have been a good economist. We
should remember that John Locke, François Quesnay and Clément
Juglar were doctors and great economists. This, however, is not the
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slation).
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case of Higinio Paris. Paris formed part of the Technical Board of
Spain, which can be considered as Franco’s first government, and
later he was a member of the Council of the National Economy, but
as was indicated by Manuel Jesús González and as Paris himself
openly acknowledged, his economic knowledge was “rather
scanty”. Paris admits that his knowledge of economics and economic
theory was indirect, having been acquired through reading the odd
handbook. Nor did he have any knowledge of economic history. Ne-
vertheless, despite this lack of analytical and historical knowledge,
Paris resolutely maintained the thesis that liberal capitalism was in-
capable of withstanding cyclical crises and that the market was inef-
ficient. The conclusions are excessively categorical for someone with
such feeble theoretical and historical knowledge.
Paris’s ideological prejudices too were of decisive importance.
He considered that liberalism and laicism represented “the denial
of all spiritual values” and “a brutal disdain for human dignity,” and
he considered labour as a “good”. In an intellectual somersault, Paris
declared that the solution lay in “overcoming” an out-dated system
with a new, totalitarian, unitary, imperial and religious State. Eco-
nomic policy should have the ultimate objective of increasing the
power and grandeur of the Nation, using all the human force avai-
lable. And he added: “These aims can only be reached through the
State management of production, distribution and also, to some ex-
tent, of consumption”.29
He shared the old mercantilists’ negative opinion of consump -
tion: “The absolute need is to create and maintain at all costs a heroic
climate, without which it is very difficult to prevent the population
from falling en masse into materialist aberrations, in the belief that
the sole objective is to increase the enjoyment of material goods, a
fatal error which, as history illustrates, always leads to a dissolution
of the Nation and to the people falling victim to foreign invasions”.
It is evident that Paris had not read Adam Smith, or if he did he re-
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jected the ideas of the great Scottish economist. In The Wealth of Na-
tions, Smith criticised the emphasis that the mercantilists placed on
production: “Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all pro-
duction; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to,
only so far as may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.
The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to at-
tempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system, the interest of the
consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and
it seems to consider production and not consumption as the ultimate
end and object of all industry and commerce”.30
It is striking how, even at the end of the 1950s, Franco’s Minister
of Agriculture, Cirilo Cánovas, considered the consumption of im-
ported food products by the Spanish population as an inadmissible
extravagance. Speaking of foreign trade and national consumption
he declared: “We cannot afford the luxury of investing the currency
that the country needs in order to advance the economic develop-
ment now under way in consumption goods or perishable goods”.31
Paris also shared the fanciful view of Spain’s natural wealth and
advocated its nationalisation, even by force, in order to achieve the
Nation’s independence. Even more forcefully he defended the need
to implement a programme of imperial expansion: “to liberate by
force … those resources of our own territory that are dominated by
foreign capital … and even exercise influence over other territories
outside the Nation which have been subjected until now to the do-
minance of other nations with less historical justification”.32
For the rest, Paris was convinced that everything could be achie-
ved through the adequate exercise of authority. A central controlling
body would have the knowledge necessary for: “statistical data eva-
luation; monetary and credit policy; investment management, both
of the State and official entities and the private sector; organisation
THE DISASTERS OF LEVIATHAN: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF AUTARKY IN SPAIN, 1939-1959
191JEEH • 3/2015
30 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book, IV; Chap-
ter VIII.
31 C. Cánovas, La agricultura y el desarrollo económico de España (our translation).
32 H. Paris, Un nuevo orden económico, p. 176 (our translation).
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of production into its different aspects; transport; pricing policy; fo-
reign trade and international payments; price and wage increases;
social security and issues relating to the length of the work day and
general working conditions”.33
Antonio Robert was an engineer and the Director General for
Industry. He too had been infected with this strange optimism re-
garding Spain’s natural wealth. The country contained “genuine car-
boniferous treasures” and the lack of oil was no problem as the
fabulous reserves of coal shale and lignite compensated for it. His
favourable assessment of Spain’s human resources, both employers
and adequately prepared employees, was also singular. Autarky was
an intermediate objective, for which the “subordination of economic
development to political requirements” had to be achieved. Particu-
larly striking was his trust in the actions of a resolute leading mino-
rity. Spain could become as industrialised as Germany, where “all it
took was for a few men to come into power who had a clear idea of
what they proposed, so that in seven years forced labour was elimi-
nated, normality was restored, autarkic industries were founded,
and eventually a formidable war machine which crossed almost all
the borders of Europe was created”.34
The mercantilism of the Franco regime was a more rudimentary
version, more political and less economic (in the sense that it was
less analytical and more counterproductive). We should remember
that Keynes, who called for state intervention, defended in his Ge-
neral Theory what he regarded as the sound aspects of mercantilist
thought. Although we will not address these issues here, suffice it
to say that Keynes believed that mercantilist policies could have
been justified at that time by the objective of reducing domestic in-
terest rates (fostering internal investment and employment) and by
their capacity to increase foreign investment.35
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34 A. Robert, Un problema nacional. La industrialización necesaria, p. 148 (our translation).
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ter 23: “Notes on Merchantilism, the Usury Laws, Stamped Money and Theories of
Under-consumption.”
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The mercantilism of the Franco regime was not so refined. Mat-
ters such as those indicated by Keynes were resolved directly by the
national-syndicalist model with government decisions: interest rates
were established by decree, as were the money supply, the volume
and destination of investments, and the exchange rate.
The Franco regime also took a mercantilist approach on other is-
sues, such as wage policy. For Thomas Mun, the most prominent En-
glish mercantilist because he was criticised by Smith, the
achievement of a favourable balance of trade depends on low inter-
nal wages as a result of an abundant workforce and a growing po-
pulation.36 In this regard the Franco regime was mercantilist: long
hours and low wages. And for population, the regime’s obsession
with raising the birth rate is well-known.
It is not surprising that Franco had a blind faith in the principle
of authority, in unquestioning obedience to orders. He had been edu-
cated according to this principle since early childhood and from the
age of 15, when he entered the military academy, this had become
his mode of conduct. In short, his experience in life had taught him
that everything consists in giving and taking orders. As the slogan
of the Falange goes: “Orders are to be obeyed with no excuses or
pretexts”. The country’s economy, which he regarded as a national
intendancy, would function in the same way as the military inten-
dancy, which in his opinion functioned well.
6. Persistence in error
The autarkic convictions of General Franco and his most loyal
collaborator, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, remained firm, despite
their evident failure. In the years prior to the Stabilisation Plan, ac-
cording to Ángel Viñas, both men opposed liberalising reforms, with
their attendant risks in the political sphere.37 On 15 March 1957, the
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37 Á. Viñas, En las garras del águila, pp. 322-323.
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newly-formed Commission for Economic Affairs, a government in-
novation, held its first meeting. Franco participated, opposing all at-
tempts at economic liberalisation, declaring that the basic problem
of the Spanish economy was the chronic trade deficit and proposing
a strategy of cutting foreign currency expenditure to the minimum.
In his delusions he continued to defend the idea of replacing impor-
ted raw materials with domestically produced substitutes. At the
meeting he enlightened his ministers with the idea of exploiting gua-
yule from Huelva as a substitute for rubber imports, which would
represent a huge saving of foreign currency – yet one more of the
General’s fanciful notions.
Meanwhile, Carrero Blanco issued a document entitled Introduc-
ción al estudio de un plan coordinado de aumento de la producción
nacional (“Introduction to the study of a coordinated plan to increase
national production”), in which he reaffirmed Spain’s great economic
potential: “Once all the technical and labour resources have been
exhausted and the whole of Spain’s exploitable area has been put into
maximum production, we will talk about whether Spain is rich or
poor”. “A sensible economic policy should seek to erase the import
of consumer goods as quickly as possible, because this has a negative
effect on our balance of payments”. Going by the old autarkic for-
mula, the Franco government sought growth in agriculture, indu-
strial import substitution, market reserves, protectionism and, of
course, restrictions on consumption (by others). What had to be avoi-
ded was “a situation where we would not have the necessary amount
of currency to satisfy all of the country’s demand for liquid fuel”.38
Manuel Jesús González very fittingly summarizes the nature of
the economic advisors of the Franco regime: “They lacked any spe-
cific training as economists. They did not understand the concept of
opportunity cost, distrusted the market and proceeded to mimic
Germany and Japan, principally with the laudable desire to con-
struct an industrial and powerful nation”.39
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39 M. J. González, Neomercantilismo en Madrid, p. 142 (our translation).
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The authorities, who fully identified with the approaches and
objectives of the government, believed themselves to be infallible.
González points out: “In short, if something was not going well, the
ideas could not be considered to be wrong. It was believed that in-
dividuals were to blame: either entrepreneurs who did not conform
to the wishes of the top politicised officials; or the general public
seek ing their own personal benefit, blind and deaf to the State guide -
lines and tendentially distrustful of the excellences of a State under-
stood as something other than a group of people with more power
but not necessarily more knowledge than the rest”.40
In other papers of mine I have given examples of these claims
of infallibility. General Franco himself believed that the problems of
supply scarcity, shortages and the black market were caused by the
evil actions of individuals, and there was not the slightest doubt in
his mind regarding the appropriateness of the government’s econo-
mic policy. In a speech to the Asamblea de Labradores y Ganaderos
(Farmers and Livestock Raisers Assembly) in Seville in 1947 he said:
“This is why I am asking rural Spain to collaborate by taking mea-
sures, necessary measures, essential measures, to put an end to this
regime of shortages so that this culture of greed does not spread to
the Spanish countryside, from the city or through speculators; we
must eradicate this greed and desire for rapid wealth, which goes
against Christian fraternity and the Catholic sense of our country,
which in the end all of us must pay for at the hour of our death”.41
The same occurred in the case of the failed Ley de Colonización
de Grandes Zonas (Law for the exploitation of large irrigable areas),
which was intended as a national-syndicalist agricultural reform.
Guillermo Castañón, an agricultural engineer who held various im-
portant positions in the National Institute for Land Exploitation, had
no doubt about the cause of the failure. In his opinion the law was
perfect, and if things were not going well it was due to the ignorance
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41 F. Franco, Palabras del Caudillo al clausurar la II Asamblea Nacional de Hermandades en el
Palacio de Oriente (our translation).
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or evilness of the landowners: “Only complete incomprehension,
based on ignorance of the objectives laid down and desired by the
Law, or worse still, deliberate reluctance to cooperate with the en-
deavours to make Spain great, can obstruct its achievement”.42
7. Conclusion
In conclusion, what I have sought to describe in this article is the
fundamental idea on which the so-called national-syndicalist eco-
nomic system was based: namely, that the State could and should
be the key player in the economic development of the country. It was
an idea without the slightest theoretical or historical basis, and its
implementation had extremely painful consequences for the majo-
rity of the Spanish population.
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